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Summary
By letter to the Canadian Judicial Council dated February 9,1990, the Honourable 
Thomas J. Mclnnis, Attorney General of Nova Scotia, asked that, pursuant to 
subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act, the Council “commence an inquiry as to 
whether, based upon the conduct which has been examined by the Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, and commented upon in its 
report, the Honourable Ian M. MacKeigan (former Chief Justice and now a 
supernumerary judge), the Honourable Gordon L.S. Hart (supernumerary judge), 
the Honourable Malachi C. Jones, the Honourable Angus L. Macdonald, and the 
Honourable Leonard L. Pace, or any of them, should be removed from office for 
any of the reasons set out in paragraphs 65(2) (a) to (d) the Judges Act 
(Canada).”
Subsequently, on April 5, 1990, the Governor in Council accepted the 
resignation of the Honourable Leonard L. Pace who had resigned for health 
reasons.1 Then on April 11,1990 the Honourable Ian M. MacKeigan attained the 
age of seventy-five years and ceased to hold office under the provisions of section 
99 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The Inquiry Committee established pursuant to the Attorney General’s request 
was therefore left with examining whether the Honourable Gordon L.S. Hart, the 
Honourable Malachi C. Jones and the Honourable Angus L. Macdonald, or any 
of them, should be removed from office.
We wish to thank Jeannie Thomas, Executive Secretary at the Canadian Judicial Council, who was 
most helpful in preparation of this section.
^ it o ^ s  note: Leonard L. Pace passed away on March 25,1991.
The Inquiry Committee unanimously concludes that it does not recommend 
the removal of the three judges.
Sommaire
Dans une lettre adresseé le 9 février 1990 au Conseil canadien de la magistrature, 
l’honorable Thomas J. Mclnnes, procureur général de la Nouvelle-Écosse, 
s’appuyant sur le paragraphe 63(1) de la Loi sur les juges, demandait au Conseil 
[Traduction] “de faire enquête sur la question de savoir si, compte tenu de la 
conduite des juges étudiée par la Commission royale sur les poursuites intentées 
contre Donald Marshall, Jr. et sur laquelle elle a fait des commentaires dans son 
rapport, il y a lieu de révoquer l’honorable Ian M. MacKeigan (ancien juge en 
chef et aujourd’hui juge surnuméraire), l’honorable Gordon L.S. Hart (juge 
surnuméraire), l’honorable Malachi C. Jones, l’honorable Angus L. Macdonald et 
L’honorable Leonard L. Pace, ou l’un ou plusiers d’entre eux, pour l’un 
quelconque des motifs exposés aux alienéas 65(l)a) à d) de la Loi sur les juges 
(Canada).
Par la suite, le 5 avril 1990, le governeur en conseil acceptait la démission de 
L’honorable Leondard L. Pace pour cause de santé.
Le 11 avril 1990, l’honorable Ian M. MacKeigan atteignant l’âge de soixante- 
quinze ans et cessait d’exercer ses fonctions conformément à l’article 99 de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1867.
Le mandat du Comité d’enquête constitué à la demande du procureur 
général ne portait désormais que la conduite de l’honorable Gordon L.S. Hart, 
l’honorable Malachi C. Jones, et l’honorable Angus L. Macdonald.
REPORT OF INQUIRY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
RICHARD C J., LAYCRAFT C J., ABELLA, AND BELLEMARE
The mandate of this Inquiry Committee, appointed under subsection 63(3) of the 
Judges Act of Canada, arises out of a request of the Honourable the Attorney 
General of Nova Scotia dated February 9,1990 to the Canadian Judicial Council:
... to commence an inquiry as to whether, based upon the conduct which has been 
examined by the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, and 
commented upon in its report, the Honourable Ian M. MacKeigan (former Chief 
Justice and now a supernumerary judge), the Honourable Gordon L.S. Hart 
(supernumerary judge, the Honourable Malachi C. Jones, the Honourable Angus 
L. Macdonald, and the Honourable Leonard L. Pace, or any of them, should be 
removed from office for any of the reasons set out in paragraphs 65 (2) (a) to (d) 
of the Judges Act.
On April 11,1990, after the establishment of our Committee, the Honourable 
Ian MacKeigan, then a supernumerary judge and former Chief Justice of Nova 
Scotia, reached the mandatory retirement age and left the Bench. On April 5, 
1990, the Honourable Leonard Pace left the Bench due to ill health. These 
retirements were verified by Orders in Council filed with us as Exhibits 8 and 9 
respectively. Accordingly, this Inquiry Committee has no jurisdiction over them.
We shall hereafter refer to the Royal Commission which inquired into the 
Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution as “the Commission.” The judges under Inquiry 
served on the panel of their court which heard a Reference in 1982 into the 
conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. on an indictment for murder. We shall refer 
to them, as either “the Court,” or “the Reference Court.”
Under the Judges Act, the Canadian Judicial Council must carry out an inquiry 
when requested to do so by the Attorney General of a Province. Accordingly, this 
Committee was appointed to inquire, and to recommend to Council, whether the 
judges named by the Attorney General should be removed from office. The 
Canadian Judicial Council designated three of its members as members of the 
Inquiry Committee; the Honourable Minister of Justice for Canada appointed the 
two members of the Bar.
* * *
II. The Establishment of This Inquiry Committee
On February 9,1990, the Honourable the Attorney General of Nova Scotia wrote 
to the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Chief Justice of Canada and Chairman 
of the Canadian Judicial Council, as follows:
As you will know, the Governor of Nova Scotia received the Report of the Royal
Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution on January 26, 1990.
* * *
In the course of its deliberations, the Royal Commission considered the conduct 
of five judges in the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia who 
heard and decided a Reference of the Donald Marshall, Jr. conviction made 
pursuant to paragraph 617 (d) [now section 690] of the Criminal Code. The five 
judges who heard the Reference were:
The Honourable Ian M. MacKeigan 
The Honourable Gordon L.S. Hart 
The Honourable Malachi C. Jones 
The Honourable Angus L. Macdonald 
The Honourable Leonard L. Pace
The decision on the Reference is reported as R. v. Marshall (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 
286.
The comments of the Royal Commission respecting the setting up of the 
Reference and the Reference decision appear at pages 113 to 127 of volume one 
of its report. [The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, 
Digest o f Findings and Recommendations 1989\. The findings in respect of the 
Reference decision are reported at page 116 where the Commissioners say:
We find:
1. that the Court of Appeal made a serious and fundamental error when it 
concluded that Donald Marshall, Jr. was to blame for his wrongful conviction.
2. that the Court selectively used the evidence before it -  as well as information 
that had not been admitted in evidence -  in order to reach its conclusions.
3. that the Court took it upon itself to ‘convict’ Marshall of a robbery with which 
he was never charged.
4. that the Court was in error when it stated the Marshall ‘admittedly’ committed 
perjury.
5. that the Court did not deal with the significant failure of the Crown to disclose 
evidence, including the conflicting statements by witnesses, to defence counsel.
6. that the Court’s suggestion that Marshall’s ‘untruthfulness... contributed in 
large measure to his conviction* was not supported by any available evidence and 
was contrary to evidence before the Court.
7. that the Court did not deal with the errors by the trial judge in limiting the 
cross-examination of [John] Pratico.
8. that Mr. Justice Leonard Pace should not have sat as a member of the panel
hearing the Reference.
9. that the Court’s decision amounted to a defence of the criminal justice system 
at Marshall’s expense, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
10. that the Court’s gratuitous comments in the last pages of its decision created 
serious difficulties for Donald Marshall, Jr., both in terms of his ability to negotiate 
compensation for his wrongful conviction and also in terms of public acceptance 
of his acquittal.
(the paragraph numbers have been added for convenience)
At pages 126 and 127 of volume one of the Royal Commission Report, the 
Commission comments upon the conduct of Mr. Justice Leonard L. Pace who 
summoned Mr. Dana Giovannetti, a lawyer on the staff of my Department, to his 
office where he was severely admonished for having raised the issue of bias with 
respect to Mr. Justice Pace’s participation on a panel of judges who were to 
consider an appeal arising from the conviction of Roy Newman Ebsaiy for 
manslaughter. Mr. Ebsary caused the death of Sanford William Seale during the 
encounter which led to the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr.
I am deeply troubled by the Commission’s findings respecting the conduct and 
decision of these judges of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova 
Scotia. It is significant that these findings were made by two Commissioners who 
are sitting judges at the present time, the Honourable Chief Justice T. Alexander 
Hickman, of Newfoundland, and the Honourable Associate Chief Justice Lawrence 
A. Poitras, of Quebec, and a former Justice, the Honourable Gregory T. Evans, 
Q.C., of Ontario.
It is absolutely essential that Nova Scotians have faith and confidence in the 
highest court in this Province. If that faith has been shaken by the findings of the 
Royal Commission, as I believe it has been, it must be restored.
Therefore, as Attorney General of Nova Scotia, and pursuant to subsection 63(1) 
of the Judges Act, I am writing to ask the Canadian Judicial Council to commence 
an inquiry as to whether, based upon the conduct which has been examined by the 
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, and commented upon 
in its report, the Honourable Ian M. MacKeigan (former Chief Justice and now 
a supernumerary judge), the Honourable Gordon L.S. Hart (supernumerary judge), 
the Honourable Malachi C. Jones, the Honourable Angus L. Macdonald, and the 
Honourable Leonard L. Pace, or any of them, should be removed from office for 
any of the reasons set out in paragraphs 65(2)(a) to (d) of the Judges Act.
The Attorney General, in response to a request by our counsel to clarify and 
specify the relationship between his concerns about the Commission findings and 
paragraphs 65(2)(a) to (d) of the Judges Act replied on May 17,1990. He noted 
that the Inquiry Committee “will not be dealing with former Chief Justice 
MacKeigan who has retired or Mr. Justice Pace who has resigned for reasons of 
health.” He also noted that the Commission had used “very strong language
which suggests the existence of improper judicial conduct,” and reiterated some 
of its findings. He concluded:
The findings of the Royal Commission may not themselves constitute a basis for 
removing one or more of the judges from office, but this strong language compels 
a review to determine whether improper motivation may be behind any action o f the 
Court, (emphasis added)
For reasons which council for the Attorney General argued vigorously and 
successfully, the Royal Commission did not have the opportunity to examine any 
of the judges regarding concerns of this kind. In my opinion, the Canadian 
Judicial Council is the appropriate forum in which such concerns can be reviewed.
I believe public confidence in the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova 
Scotia was shaken by the findings of the Royal Commission. That confidence can 
be restored by the knowledge that there is a forum for review of judicial conduct, 
and by the completion of that review by distinguished jurists. In the course of its 
inquiry, the Committee will have the opportunity to identify which of the reasons, 
if any, set out in paragraphs 65(2)(a) to (d) of the Judges Act are applicable in the 
circumstances.
You have asked whether, in my opinion, there is any evidence, other than in the 
record that was placed before the Court of Appeal on the Reference, that should 
be placed before the present Inquiry Committee. Except for the evidence from 
judges who participated in the Reference, I do not think there is other evidence 
which I would suggest for consideration. Specifically, I have considered whether 
transcripts or exhibits from the Royal Commission should be considered and I have 
concluded that there is no evidence or exhibit respecting the remaining three 
judges which should be brought to your attention.
I remain willing to co-operate with the Inquiry Committee, and I would be pleased 
to hear from you if there is anything further you may wish from me.
Yours very truly,
(signed)
Thomas J. Mclnnis
The applicable sections of the Judges Act state:
65(2) Where in the opinions of the Council, the judge in respect of whom an 
inquiry or investigation has been made has become incapacitated or disabled from 
the due execution of the office of judge by reason of
(a) age or infirmity,
(b) having been guilty of misconduct,
(c) having failed in the due execution of that office, or
(d) having been placed by his conduct or otherwise, 
in a position incompatible with the due execution
of that office the Council, in its report to the 
Minister under subsection (1), may recommend that 
the judge be removed from office... .
We were directed by the Canadian Judicial Council:
that the Inquiry be held in public except when in the Inquiry Committee’s view the 
public interest and the integrity of the judicial process require that it be held in 
private.
We have not found it necessary to hold any of our hearings in private except 
for one matter concerning a possible representation conflict on the part of counsel 
for the judge which counsel for Mr. Marshall asked us to hear in private. We 
decided that matter was wholly unrelated to the matters in question on this 
Inquiry. We held our public hearings in Halifax on June 4, 5 and 6, and July 10 
and 11, 1990.
The Committee first considered what evidence, if any, should be called. Our 
counsel submitted:
(a) that, apart from possible testimony of the Reference judges, their conduct 
should be “judged” only on the evidence they had before them at the time of the 
Reference Appeal;
(b) that there is a serious constitutional question concerning the propriety of 
judges being required to testify about the preparation of their judgments. He 
recognized that the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKeigan v. Hickman (1989), 
61 D.L.R. (4th) 688, left open the possibility that judges might be required to 
testify in some circumstances, but urged that we should not do so in this case. At 
Volume 1, page 41 of the transcript of proceedings before us he said:
I add that one of the principles that emerges throughout any discussion of this 
subject in the precedents is that one should not compel a superior court judge to 
explain why he delivered a certain judgment except in the most extreme and 
compelling circumstances.
(c) that the only evidence he proposed to adduce was that of the Registrar of 
the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Mr. Smith, who 
produced and identified the record of the Case on Appeal on the Reference which 
was admitted as evidence in this Inquiry.
In response to Mr. Yarosky’s submission, we replied at Transcript, Volume 1, 
page 51 that we did not propose to rule on the question of whether the judges 
should be compelled to testify until we had the advantage of having the admissible 
evidence analyzed by all interested parties, and we accordingly reserved our 
decision on that important question.
We then proceeded to hear the submissions of counsel for all interested 
parties who undertook extensive and helpful analyses of the evidence and relevant 
authorities. Counsel were able to agree on the contents of the record before the
Reference Court.
III. The Judges as Witnesses
While there may well be some exceptional circumstances when judges could be 
required to give evidence, we do not think that MacKeigatt v. Hickman (supra), 
goes so far as to decide that judges are compellable to give evidence about the 
deliberative or decisional process.
In this case, one fundamental point stands out. The complaint against the 
judges is not about their disposition of the Reference for they acquitted Mr. 
Marshall and there cannot be any question about the correctness of that decision. 
Rather, the question before us relates to the way in which they expressed 
themselves in a subsidiary part of their Reasons for Judgment. It was not argued 
before us that improper motives led to the six impugned paragraphs. Ms. Derrick, 
for Mr. Marshall, did urge that it was serious judicial misconduct for the judges 
to use the language they did in the last six paragraphs of the Reference judgment, 
but she did not allege improper motivation.
The questions which might be expected to be put to the judges in this case, 
would go specifically into the decisional process of an appellate court, with 
improper motivation not in issue. To require the judges to testify would be to 
take our Inquiry into their private deliberations about, and composition of, 
Reasons for Judgment. That course would, in effect, ask them “Why did you say 
this?” or “Why didn’t you say something else?” or perhaps “What did your 
colleagues say about...” given topics.
Apart from the fact that these questions would be asked almost 8 years after 
the judgment was written, it would be entirely inappropriate to submit judges to 
such interrogation. In our view such questions would strike at the very heart of 
judicial independence.
The rule that judges should speak, or explain themselves, only once, through 
their judgments, is a wise and salutary one, based on the long experience of the 
common law. We see no compelling reason to depart from it in this case 
particularly since our mandate is to compare what was said by the Court with the 
record before it, a task which makes it neither necessary nor appropriate to 
require the judges to give evidence in this proceeding.
IV. The Test for Removal
While there appears to be no single articulated standard against which to measure 
the conduct of judges when their removal is at issue, certain common assumptions 
about the process appear to be accepted in the literature and jurisprudence.
First, it is accepted that the judicial role, involving as it does the requirement 
to make decisions free from external interference or influence, demands the 
independence of the judges (S. Shetreet and J. Deschênes (eds.), Judicial 
Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) at page 393; cited with approval 
in the Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 69-70, per Dickson CJ.). It is 
for this reason that British judges were first granted security of tenure during good 
behaviour in 1688, a security guaranteed by subsection 99(1) of the Canadian 
Constitution, and regarded as the first of the essential conditions of judicial 
independence...” iy aiente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 693 at 694 per Le Dain 
J.).
Judicial independence carries with it not merely the right to tenure during 
good behaviour, it encompasses, and indeed encourages, a corollary judicial duty 
to exercise and articulate independent thought in judgments free from fear of 
removal (Sirros v. Moore, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 459 at 467, per Lord Denning M.R.). 
In consequence of this duty, judges are free to express their views of the case 
before them in a forthright way.
This duty does not immunize judges from fair criticism, whether of a public 
or judicial nature, nor does it imply that judges do not err (A.M. Dobie, “A Judge 
Judges Judges” [1951] W.L.Q. 471 at 472); rather, it guarantees that the expression 
of opinions honestly held by judges in their adjudication of the relevant law, 
evidence or policy in a specific case will not endanger their tenure. However, once 
a case has been decided, the judgment comes, appropriately, under the critical 
scrutiny of lawyers, academics, the public, and the media.
Judges must accept this criticism under the restriction that they are not free 
to answer it. They are expected to speak only through their Reasons for 
Judgment, and thereafter never to explain their judgments.
Secondly, it is acknowledged that “the removal of a judge is not to be 
undertaken lightly ('Valente, supra, at 697).” The misconduct alleged and 
demonstrated must be of sufficient gravity to justify interference with the sanctity 
of judicial independence. In his classic work, Judges on Trial (1976), Professor 
Shetreet defined the test when Parliament would interfere to remove a judge. He 
said at page 272:
Unless it can be attributed to improper motives or to a decay of mental power, a
mistake in fact or in law or any error of judgment will not justify the interference
of Parliament. These matters are within the province of the appellate courts; and
Parliament will not assume the role of a court of appeal.
Thus this Inquiry Committee, which is the first step in the Canadian 
parliamentary process for removal of a judge does not function in this case as a 
court of appeal reviewing the findings of either the Reference Court or the Royal 
Commission.
Thirdly, it is also acknowledged that judicial independence has attained 
entrenchment in our constitution not merely, or even mainly, for the benefit of the 
judiciary. It is also a fundamental benefit to the public served by the judiciary (S. 
Shetreet, Judges on Trial, supra, at 276; Valente, supra, at 172; MacKeigan v. 
Hickman, supra, at 696 and 707). Public confidence in the independent and 
im partial administration of justice is, in effect, the first proposition in the syllogism 
which has as its second proposition the need for independent and impartial judges, 
and as its conclusion the independence of the judiciary. Any test which attempts 
to formulate when the removal of a judge is appropriate must necessarily include 
and balance the public interest as well as judicial independence.
* * *
The test we would propose to apply, as applicable to this case, is an alloy of 
these many considerations and takes the following form:
Is the conduct alleged so manifestly and profoundly destructive of the concept of 
the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judicial role, that public 
confidence would be sufficiently undermined to render the judge incapable of 
executing the judicial office?
V. The Issues of This Inquiry
In view of the way the issues were argued before us, we find it unnecessary to 
discuss the Commission’s specific criticisms of the judgment of the Reference 
Court. We say this because, in our view, the serious criticisms of the Reference 
Court by the Commission may be merged into a single, comprehensive question 
which may be stated as follows:
Was it misconduct justifying removal from office for the Court to characterize the 
conduct of Mr. Marshall as it did having regard to all the circumstances it knew 
from the record which it had before it?
* * *
It seems to us that during the course of argument in this case, the emphasis 
shifted from error demonstrating bias to allegations of a lack of fairness in the way 
the Court characterized the conduct of Mr. Marshall.
We wish at the outset to state our strong disapproval of some of the language 
used by the Reference Court in its comments about Mr. Marshall. In reviewing 
the record before the Reference Court, we cannot help but be struck by the 
incongruity between the Court’s legal conclusion that Mr. Marshall’s conviction in 
1971 was “unreasonable” and “not now supported by the evidence” and its obiter 
observations that nonetheless “any miscarriage of justice” was “more apparent 
than real.” Surely it cannot be seriously argued that the conviction of an innocent 
person, let alone one who was at the time an adolescent, who was then unfairly 
incarcerated for more than ten years, was anything but a blatant miscarriage of
justice.
The wrongful conviction and imprisonment of any person constitutes a real 
miscarriage of justice; it cannot be termed “more apparent than real.” This is 
especially so when the conviction is based upon perjured evidence obtained with 
the complicity of the agencies of the crown. The miscarriage is greater still when 
crown agencies, subsequent to conviction but while an appeal is pending, receive 
conclusive or practically conclusive evidence of innocence but do not move 
promptly, or at all, to have the conviction reviewed. The miscarriage of justice, 
of course, becomes worse each day the innocent person remains imprisoned. 
There is no formula that it is possible to suggest that can be applied to redress 
completely more than ten years of wrongful imprisonment or which will accurately 
reflect the horror of what happened to Mr. Marshall. We have no difficulty in 
assuming that any reasonable person, knowing the circumstances adduced in 
evidence before the Reference Court, would regard some of its language to be at 
least inappropriate.
Nevertheless, in making findings of credibility, the Court was within its 
jurisdiction. It was entitled to believe or disbelieve any of the witnesses before it, 
including Mr. Marshall. Accepting part of Mr. MacNeil’s evidence, the Court 
concluded that an attempted robbery had been in progress. There was evidence 
before the Court from which this finding could honestly be made. We do not say 
that this is what happened, or that another court would have so concluded.
In disbelieving part of Mr. Marshall’s testimony, the Court concluded, from the 
evidence, that his “evasions” had unleashed the tragic consequences he experi­
enced and that he had thwarted his own defence. The Court also apparently 
concluded that Mr. Marshall would probably not have been convicted if he had 
told his lawyers, as he did not, where the real murderer could be found. And the 
Court concluded that Mr. Marshall was at least an unsatisfactory witness who did 
not tell the truth. It is not for us to substitute our own opinion about the findings 
of credibility made by the Reference Court. We are left to conclude that those 
findings led the Court to the impression which found expression in the obiter 
paragraphs.
The real question, however, is whether inappropriate language, even grossly 
inappropriate language, constitutes judicial misconduct in the circumstances of this 
case, keeping in mind that the Reference Court was entitled in the performance 
of its judicial duty to analyze the evidence and to comment upon it.
What we must observe is that in the six obiter paragraphs the Court focused 
upon Mr. Marshall to the exclusion of the other destructive factors which had a 
role in the wrongful conviction. A court is entitled to comment on the evidence 
before it and upon the conduct of the parties or witnesses. Nevertheless, by
referring exclusively to Mr. Marshall, the six paragraphs give the impression that 
the Court was ignoring the grossly incorrect conduct of other persons and 
concentrating on the victim of the tragedy.
The Court may have been reluctant to criticize those who were not before it, 
but it had the choice of noting that fact. Any criticism, if at all, due Mr. Marshall 
would be mild indeed compared to that due to those who had given perjured 
evidence, to those who had induced the witnesses to give it, to those who had 
failed to disclose prior inconsistent statements of witnesses and to those who 
suppressed the evidence of an eyewitness to the murder.
Whatever its intention in choosing to refer only to the person it acquitted, 
there can be no doubt that the impact of the Court’s derogatory obiter statements 
created the strong impression that it was not responsive to the injustice of an 
innocent person spending more than ten years in jail. Although the Court’s 
mandate was to determine whether or not Mr. Marshall’s conviction was 
sustainable and not to investigate all of the circumstances surrounding it, as it 
would have been obliged to under paragraph 613(c) of the Criminal Code (now 
paragraph 690(c)), in taking it upon itself to comment in obiter on these 
surrounding circumstances, the Court ought to have referred to the other factors 
apparent in the material before it.
We would go so far as to suggest that the Court, in seeming to attribute to 
Marshall exclusive responsibility for the wrongful conviction, and thereby 
inferentially exculpating the other persons and factors demonstrated in the record 
to have played a key role in that conviction, so seriously mischaracterized the 
evidence before it as to commit legal error (Desgagne v. Fabrique de St. Philippe 
D ’Arvida, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 19 at 31, per Beetz, J.).
We take it as a presumption, however, that judges ought not to be removed 
from office for legal error. Having found that the five judges in the collegial 
decision-making capacity were inappropriately harsh in their condemnation of the 
victim of an injustice they were mandated to correct, we nonetheless accept the 
submissions of all counsel that their removal from office is not warranted. Whde 
their remarks in obiter were, in our view, in error, and inappropriate in failing to 
give recognition to manifest injustice, we do not feel that they are reflective of 
conduct so destructive that it renders the judges incapable of executing their office 
impartially and independently with continued public confidence. The three 
remaining judges collectively had 58 years of judicial experience prior to deciding 
the Reference and have each served since for seven more years. Moreover, the 
Court did in fact acquit Mr. Marshall and find his conviction unsustainable.
We do not make our criticisms lightly. We are deeply conscious that criticism 
can itself undermine public confidence in the judiciary, but on balance conclude
in this case that confidence would more severely be impaired by our failure to 
criticize inappropriate conduct than it would by our failure to acknowledge it.
VI. Conclusion
While we cannot condone or excuse the severity of the Reference Court’s 
condemnation of Donald Marshall, Jr., and in particular its extraordinary 
observation that any miscarriage of justice was “more apparent than real”, we do 
not find that the comments can lead to the conclusion that the judges cannot 
execute their office with the impartiality, integrity and independence the public 
rightly expects from the judiciary. We therefore, do not recommend their removal 
from office.
REASONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE McEACHERN 
I. Introduction
While I agree entirely with the Majority of the Committee that our Report should 
be against any recommendation for removal of the remaining Judges from their 
offices, I find myself unable to agree with some parts of that Report for the 
reasons which I shall endeavour to state.
I am able to adopt Parts I to IV inclusive of the Majority Report except for 
the syllogism in their Part IV which I do not consider appropriate for the 
discussion of legal principles and I do not have the same view as the majority 
about our responsibility to review the findings of the Commission. I do agree that 
the Commission was entirely within its jurisdiction, but I do not think that should 
deter us from examining their findings as requested by the Attorney General.
In fact, my disagreement with the balance of the majority report relates largely 
to the mandate we have been given, and to the majority’s characterization of the 
language of the obiter dicta comments of the Reference Court after it correctly 
allowed Mr. Marshall’s appeal and acquitted him of the offence of murder. I also 
think the Report of the Royal Commission and the Majority Report raises an 
important question regarding the right of judges to say what they really think 
about the cases they are deciding.
As I shall endeavour to demonstrate, it is of crucial importance that judges 
speak forthrightly, even bluntly whenever the circumstances require us to do so. 
This is one of those matters, and I take no comfort from saying what I believe 
must be said.
The Majority Report, includes no discussion of the scathing criticisms and
devastating findings made by the Commission about the judgement of the 
Reference Court. Before setting out the Commission’s findings it will be 
convenient to mention that the dichotomy between the Court and the Commission 
arises out of a fundamental difference of opinion regarding the actual circum­
stances of the encounter between Mr. Marshall and Mr. Sandy Seale with Mr. Roy 
Ebsary and Mr. James MacNeil.
First, based largely upon the admissions of Mr. Marshall and the crucial 
evidence of Mr. MacNeil, the Court concluded that Mr. Marshall and Mr. Seale 
were engaged in a robbery at the time Mr. Ebsary stabbed Mr. Seale. The 
Commission found otherwise.
Secondly, based upon the evidence of Mr. Marshall given for the first time at 
the Reference that Mr. Ebsary told him approximately where he lived, and other 
evidence, the Court concluded (a) that Mr. Marshall was not a satisfactory witness 
who did not tell the truth at his trial when he failed to disclose that he knew where 
the real killer might probably be found, and (b) that Mr. Marshall’s admitted 
failure to tell even his own lawyer that he possessed this crucial evidence 
contributed to his conviction. Again, the Commission reached different 
conclusions on these important questions.
It is central to the view I have of this matter that there was evidence before 
the Court that permitted it reasonably and rationally to reach the conclusions I 
have just described.
* * *
III. Our Mandate
It is clear that it was these findings and criticisms that led the Attorney-General 
to initiate Council’s review of the conduct of these judges. That makes it 
imperative, in my view, that we should come to grips with them.
* * *
While I have no wish to review the findings of the Commission, I know of no 
way to answer the enquiry of the Attorney General other than to examine those 
findings in the light of the evidence which was before the Reference Court.
IV. Analysis of the Commission’s 10 Points
After much anxious consideration I have concluded that most of those findings and 
criticisms are not valid. I shall discuss them individually.
1. That the Court of Appeal made a serious and fundamental error when it 
concluded that Donald Marshall, Jr. was to blame for his wrongful conviction.
The Court did not conclude that Mr. Marshall was to blame for his wrongful 
conviction. What the Court said was that he “helped secure his own conviction” 
and that, “by his untruthfulness...[he] contributed in large measure to his 
conviction.”
In both cases the Court gave reasons for its conclusions. As outlined in Part 
I of the Majority Report, there was ample evidence which logically and reasonably 
permitted the Court to reach those conclusions. In my view the Court made no 
serious or fundamental error as alleged.
2. That the Court selectively used the evidence before it -  as well as 
information that had not been admitted in evidence -  in order to reach its 
conclusions.
All courts use evidence selectively. One of the most important judicial functions 
is to decide what evidence to accept and what evidence to reject. Fact finding is 
largely a process of making choices about what evidence to believe or disbelieve, 
and what believable evidence to act upon. The Commission’s words suggest, and 
would be read to indicate that the Court should not have engaged in that process.
I think what it meant to convey was either that the Court did not deal with 
every legal and factual issue which the Commission later thought the Court should 
have included in its judgment, or that the Court should have made different 
findings on the evidence. Viewed this way, this item is repeated in later items 
which I shall reach in a moment.
I am unable to find where, if at all, the Court used any significant information 
that was not formally admitted into evidence in order to reach its conclusions. 
The Commission seems to have been troubled by this question but the only 
reference to which we were directed, or which I could find, was one relating to an 
affidavit of Mr. Marshall’s former lawyers which was filed with the Court but not 
actually admitted into evidence. It was not harmful to Mr. Marshall. I also note 
that at page 120 of its Report the Commission suggested that the Court should 
have referred to filed but unadmitted material.
3. That the Court took it upon itself to ‘convict’ Marshall of a robbery with 
which he was never charged.
The Court did not ‘convict’ Mr. Marshall of robbery, nor (because of the quotation 
marks) do I think the Commission intended to suggest that it did even though that 
is how these words are likely to be read. Although most legally trained persons 
know it is impossible to include a robbery count in an indictment for murder 
(making such a conviction in the circumstances of this case legally impossible), the 
public may well not understand that nicety. Any public misapprehension in this 
connection should be corrected.
What the court did was to decide, on ample evidence, particularly that of Mr. 
MacNeil but also that of Mr. Marshall himself, that Mr. Seale was killed in the 
course of a robbery.
I do not say that is what actually happened. The Court and the Commission 
reached different conclusions on that question. But I have no doubt whatsoever 
that there was evidence before the Court which clearly permitted it to conclude 
that there had been at least an attempted robbery which was an important part of 
the narrative the Court was entitled to discuss.
The use of the following descriptive phrases by the Court, namely:
“By planning a robbery with the aid of Mr. Seale,...” and;“... that during a robbery 
Seale was stabbed...” and;“... he continued to be evasive about the robbery... .”
do not support an allegation that “... the Court took it upon itself to ‘convict’ 
Marshall of a robbery with which he was never charged.”
4. That the Court was in error when it stated that Marshall ‘admittedly’ 
committed perjury.
Semantically, the Court was not strictly accurate when it referred to Mr. Marshall’s 
‘admitted’ perjury. What happened, as already mentioned, was that Mr. Marshall, 
who was under oath at his trial to tell the whole truth, did not disclose that he 
knew where Mr. Ebsary lived, and other circumstances of the encounter. Mr. 
Marshall admitted in his evidence that he did not disclose these facts at his trial 
which was a most important matter leading to many serious consequences. There 
were substantial differences in the evidence of Mr. Marshall at trial and on the 
Reference. I doubt if it is necessary to say anything more on this question.
5. That the Court did not deal with the significant failure of the Crown to 
disclose evidence, including the conflicting statements by witnesses, to defence 
counsel.
This is part of a larger question relating to the failure of the Court to deal with 
a number of matters in its judgement which the Commission obviously thought 
should have been included. For the reasons explained in... the Majority Report, 
the Court did not have before it the evidence of the police witnesses. Similarly, 
the Court did not have the evidence of the Crown officers who would have been 
responsible for such disclosure. The Court did not know who was to blame for 
this misfortune, or what explanations or excuses all or any of them may have had.
Thus, great injustice may have been done if the Court, without hearing the 
evidence of such witnesses, had “dealt with” such failure of disclosure. It is a 
common rule of practice in all courts, and a wise rule, that courts should not deal 
with such matters without hearing the witnesses. I do not think the Court should
be criticized on this account.
6. That the Court’s suggestion that Marshall’s ‘untruthfulness... contributed in 
large measure to his conviction’ was not supported by any available evidence and 
was contrary to evidence before the Court.
As already mentioned, there was a wide divergence of opinion between the Court 
and the Commission about the facts of this encounter. The Court, apparently 
accepting the evidence of Mr. Marshall regarding his conversation with Mr. 
Ebsary, and Mr. MacNeil’s evidence about the robbery or attempted robbery, 
which was confirmed in part by Mr. Marshall, concluded first that there was 
indeed a robbery, secondly that Mr. Marshall had not told the whole truth and had 
harmed his defence at trial, and thirdly that if he had disclosed the fact that he 
knew where Mr. Ebsary lived, he would probably not have been convicted of this 
offence.
In my view, there was ample evidence before the Court which permitted it to 
reach their conclusions. I have already discussed the robbery and untruthful 
issues. As to the third item, it must be remembered that Mr. Marshall’s evidence 
at trial was that Mr. Seale was killed for no apparent reason by a stranger who 
said he was a priest from Manitoba who was in the park late at night enquiring 
about bootleggers and women. This might have been true, but in the dynamics of 
a jury trial it was a story that might well not be believed, and it was not believed, 
by the jury who also had the evidence of “eye witnesses” to the contrary.
Timely disclosure of the location of Mr. Ebsary and Mr. MacNeil might well 
have assisted Mr. Marshall in his defence. It is true that the police knew the 
identity of Mr. Ebsary and Mr. MacNeil after the trial and suppressed that 
information, but it is far from certain that Mr. Marshall would have been charged 
(or convicted) if that evidence had been known earlier. It was the view of the 
Commission... with which I respectfully agree, that “... defence counsel armed with 
this new information would in all likelihood have successfully argued for a new 
trial.” This suggests to me the Commission shared the Court’s view about the 
importance of this evidence.
Mr. Marshall did not even tell his own lawyer about this crucial evidence. If 
he had done so the lawyer would, in the Court’s view, likely have located Mr. 
Ebsary and Mr. MacNeil with consequences that could only have been favourable 
to Mr. Marshall. Certainly it would have strengthened his defence greatly.
The Commission, on the other hand, found in Mr. Marshall’s favour on the 
questions of robbery and truthfulness, but does not come to grips with Mr. 
Marshall’s failure to tell his lawyer of this evidence.
I do not presume to say which of the Court or the Commission is correct.
Each heard the evidence and each was within its jurisdiction in reaching the 
conclusions it expressed. I am satisfied, however, that it cannot possibly be said, 
as the Commission said, that the Court’s conclusions were “not supported by any 
available evidence and was contrary to evidence before the Court.” There was 
ample evidence before the Court on which any tribunal, acting judicially, could 
reach the conclusions the Court reached.
7. That the Court did not deal with the errors by the trial judge in limiting the 
cross-examination of Pratico.
Canadian appellate practice does not require or expect Courts to deal with every 
argument that might be available on the evidence, particulary when the appeal is 
being allowed on other grounds. Such was the law at the time of the Reference 
and there was no reason why the Court should have dealt with this question.
It should also be remembered that the error in limiting cross-examination 
could only have led to a new trial which was of no moment once the Court 
directed that the absence of evidence required an acquittal.
On this point and many others, the Commission has expressed strong criticisms 
based upon views of law and practice that do not accord with principles of 
appellate procedure generally accepted in the common law world. This appears 
also in connection with the Commission criticisms of the Court’s failure to deal 
with other questions unnecessary to their decision.
8. That Mr. Justice Leonard Pace should not have sat as a member of the panel 
hearing the Reference.
I agree with the finding of the Commission that responsibility for the assignment 
of judges to appeals rested with the Chief Justice. As he is not a person about 
whom any recommendation may be made, it would not be appropriate to say 
anything about this question.
9. That the Court’s decision amounted to a defence of the criminal justice 
system at Marshall’s expense, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary.
This is a characterization of the Court’s decision which arises from the context of 
the Commission’s Report at pages 124-125 where it is stated:
The decision amounted to a defence of the system at Marshall’s expense, 
notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The Court of Appeal’s decision to defend the system is all the more extraordinary 
in view of its refusal to hear evidence from the police. The police affidavits were 
not received into evidence and no oral testimony was given by the police. In our 
legal system, any decision to affix blame or responsibility requires a full airing of
the evidence on all sides of the issue; scrupulous adherence to elementary
principles of fairness and testing of the evidence by cross-examination provides a
sound foundation on which to base a decision.
It is not correct that the Court “refused to hear the evidence of the police.” 
What happened is clearly explained above and need not be repeated. Once the 
so-called eye witnesses recanted, and with Mr. MacNeil then exonerating Mr. 
Marshall of murder, there was no need for further evidence. Counsel for Mr. 
Marshall objected to the admission of the police evidence on the ground of irrel­
evancy. For that reason, in accordance with the submissions of both counsel, the 
Court declined to hear the evidence.
It must also be remembered that the Court heard all the evidence which 
counsel for the Crown and for Mr. Marshall tendered. It is a principle of law 
which lies at the root of the adversarial system that Courts, particularly Appeal 
Courts, do not seek out evidence. That is the responsibility of counsel.
In this case the Court heard all the evidence which was offered and it is 
difficult to understand how it could be criticized for not hearing evidence that 
counsel did not tender.
There can be no doubt, as I read the Commission Report that its criticism 
relates to the obiter comments, and not to the judgment acquitting Mr. Marshall. 
The Commission found the Court’s criticisms of Mr. Marshall to be a “defence of 
the criminal justice system,” which is a value judgment the Commission was 
entitled to make. But it is incomprehensible, to use the Commission’s word, to say 
that in making its comments the Court “ignored the evidence and refused to hear 
all evidence relative to the issue of responsibility.” There was ample evidence to 
support the Court’s views and, as I have said, the Court did not refuse to hear any 
evidence. There is no defence of the criminal justice system in the judgment of 
the Court.
What I think the Commission must have intended to say was that the Court 
should have accepted the Reference evidence of Mr. Marshall that he was not 
engaged in a robbery because “it didn’t happen,” and that by only criticizing Mr. 
Marshall the Court was impliedly exonerating everyone else of responsibility. In 
my view the Court’s words do not permit that construction. I shall have more to 
say abut the Court’s criticisms of Mr. Marshall later.
I am uncertain what the Commission meant by “notwithstanding overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.” I think this was intended to mean that the evidence of 
blame on the part of others (than Mr. Marshall) was overwhelming.
With respect, there was evidence which permitted the Court to attribute some 
responsibility to Mr. Marshall. The evidence necessary to fix blame on others,
(except the eye-witnesses whose evidence was extensively discussed), was 
incomplete, and I have already explained why it would have been improper for the 
Court to attempt that exercise.
In any event, it is a serious exaggeration to say that the evidence against any 
conclusion stated by the Court was “overwhelming.”
10. That the Court’s gratuitous comments in the last pages of its decision 
created serious difficulties for Donald Marshall, Jr., both in terms of his ability 
to negotiate compensation for his wrongful conviction and also in terms of public 
acceptance of his acquittal.
I have no doubt that the consequences just quoted from the Commission’s Report 
were accurate. What is in question here is the right, and sometimes the 
obligation, of a Court to state its conclusion regarding the conduct of a party as 
disclosed by the evidence. As just mentioned, I shall have more to say about this 
in a moment, but it is my view that we expect our judges to speak directly, even 
bluntly, so that there will be no misunderstanding of what they mean. It has never 
been the law that judges should be investigated with a view to possible removal for 
doing so.
V. Further Criticisms of the court by the Commission
In addition to the foregoing 10 Points, the Commission included some further 
serious criticisms of the Court within the pages of its Report which the Attorney 
General expressly referred to the Canadian Judicial Council. I do not think it 
possible to leave them unmentioned although I shall not discuss them all as they 
tend to become repetitious.
1. Onus of Proof
In its comments the Court said:
[83] By hiding the facts from his lawyers and the police Mr. Marshall effectively 
prevented development of the only defence available to him, namely, that during 
a robbeiy Seale was stabbed by one of the intended victims. He now says that he 
knew approximately where the man lived who stabbed Seale and had a pretty good 
description of him. With this information the truth of the matter might well have 
been uncovered by the police.
At page 120 the Commission said:
The Court’s characterization of the ‘robbeiy’ as being the ‘only defence available’ 
to Marshall is curious in the extreme. Surely in our criminal justice system there 
is no onus on an accused to develop a defence. Surely the onus and obligation on 
the part of the Crown is to bring forward truthful evidence which, if accepted will 
support the conviction. How can an accused be blamed if he is convicted on the
basis of perjured testimony?
With respect, this criticism confuses the onus of proof with the burden of 
calling evidence at certain stages of a trial. The onus of proving the guilt of the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt is always upon the crown which assumes that 
onus at the start of a trial and it never shifts to the accused.
There is never any obligation upon an accused to give evidence or to adduce 
evidence. At the end of the Crown’s case, however, sufficient evidence may have 
been presented by the Crown so that the accused is in the position where he may 
be convicted if he does not call a defence. He is under no obligation to do so, but 
he runs the risk of being found guilty if he does not.
One never knows at the close of the Crown’s case, whether the jury has 
believed the evidence of the Crown, or whether the jury has been persuaded that 
the Crown has discharged the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Those are 
judgments that are made by the defence in the course of nearly every criminal 
trial.
That was the position in which Mr. Marshall found himself at the close of the 
Crown’s case at his trial. The Crown had called “eye-witness” evidence that said 
he stabbed and killed Mr. Seale. If Mr. Marshall did not call a defence he was 
seriously at risk of being convicted. He apparently decided, no doubt on the 
advice of counsel, that he should call a defence, and he actually gave evidence 
himself. When the decision was made to call a defence it was crucial that he put 
forward the best possible defence he could.
His defence was that a stranger had killed Mr. Seale for no apparent reason. 
This was a defence which rested entirely upon the believability of Mr. Marshall’s 
evidence by the jury. The quality of his defence, both in the cross-examination of 
the Crown’s witnesses, and in his own defence, would have been enhanced 
considerably, perhaps conclusively, if he could have identified Mr. Ebsary as the 
killer of Mr. Seale, and if he could have called Mr. MacNeil to support his own 
testimony that he was not the killer.
The Commission seems to have been of the view that these principles were 
somehow inoperative because Mr. Marshall was convicted on perjured evidence. 
The principles I have just described clearly applied during Mr. Marshall’s trial. 
The correction of an injustice caused by perjured evidence is a completely different 
process.
What the Court was saying was only that by failing to be more forthcoming 
about crucial evidence that only he knew about (where Ebsary might be found), 
and by avoiding the question of robbery which explained Mr. Ebsar/s reaction, 
Mr. Marshall did indeed preclude the development of the best defence which he
needed to defend himself against the evidence, perjured or non-perjured, which 
had been presented by the Crown. The Court made no mistake regarding the 
onus of proof.
2. The Location of Mr. Ebsary and Mr. MacNeil
Also at page 120, the Commission said “We can think of no legitimate reason why 
the Court would blame Marshall for the police’s failure to find Ebsary and 
McNeil[sic].”
The Court did not blame Mr. Marshall for the failure of the police to find Mr. 
Ebsary and Mr. MacNeil. What the Court said was that with a timely disclosure 
the police “might well have become aware of them.”
We do not know precisely what Mr. Marshall told the police during their 
investigation, but it seems clear that he did not disclose, even to his trial lawyer, 
that he knew where the person who killed Mr. Seale could probably be found until 
he gave that evidence at the Reference.
The foregoing, in my view, is a legitimate reason for the Court to lay some of 
the responsibility for this misfortune upon Mr. Marshall.
3. Miscarriage of Justice
At page 125 the Commission said:
A fair reading of the judgment indicates that the Court of Appeal found there to 
be no miscarriage of Justice. The conviction was quashed on the basis that it was 
now unsupported by any evidence (subparagraph 613(l)(a)(i)). It was not quashed 
on the ground that there was a miscarriage of justice (subparagraph 613(l)(a)(iii)).
In my view, the Court did not find there had been no miscarriage of justice. 
It allowed his appeal and acquitted him. It chose to do so under subparagraph 
613(1) (a) (i) of the then Criminal Code, which deals with convictions which are 
unreasonable and are not supported by the evidence rather than under 
subparagraph (iii) which deals with any ground where there was a miscarriage of 
justice.
It does not follow that the Court did not think there was a miscarriage of 
justice. As already explained, the Court did not examine the circumstances which 
led to the obvious miscarriage of justice and it was probably correct, therefore, in 
confining itself to the head of jurisdiction upon which there could be no doubt.
4. Criticism of Mr. Marshall’s Conduct
Running through the Commission’s Report is a recurring theme that the Court 
ought not to have criticized Mr. Marshall, particularly in the absence of a 
discussion of the circumstances which led to the perjured evidence, and the 
suppression of evidence before, during and after his trial.
For the reasons already mentioned, it would not have been proper for the 
Court to express conclusions on matters which had not been investigated by 
evidence and argument before them. The question therefore is whether it is 
improper (“legal error” as found by the majority), for the Court to criticize Mr. 
Marshall at all.
There has never been any rule of law or practice limiting the right of a judge 
in court or in Reasons for Judgment from saying what he or she thinks should be 
said even though he or she may decide for any number of reasons not to criticize 
others who may also deserve critical mention. This freedom of judges to speak 
their minds has been recognized as one of the hallmarks of judicial independence 
and one of the prices society pays for the benefits of a judiciary which says what 
it thinks should be said.
This judicial right is not a license for abuse. First, if a judge’s criticism or 
comments indicate unfitness to discharge the judicial function, then he or she faces 
inquiry and, in a proper case, removal from office. In this case, no suggestions 
have been made of dishonourable or improper motive on the part of the 
Reference judges, and no unfitness of any kind was argued except for these few 
comments. Even counsel for Mr. Marshall made no such suggestion. These men 
are completely honourable judges who have served with distinction for many years. 
Justices Hart, Macdonald and Jones served 22, 20 and 16 years respectively on the 
Court before this matter occurred, and each has served for 7 years subsequently 
without any similar allegations.
Secondly, once a judgment is delivered, it is “given over,” as the cases say, to 
critical scrutiny by colleagues on the Bench, the Bar, the academic community, the 
public, the media and by the higher courts who have from time to time com­
mented upon or criticized intemperate or injudicious language. To any criticism 
of their judgments the judges are expected not to reply. Generally speaking, this 
amalgam of constraints has with very few exceptions kept judicial comments within 
reasonable and proper grounds.
In this case, while acquitting Mr. Marshall, the judges obviously considered it 
important to add some comments about his conduct. They considered it proper 
to point out that he had been engaged in a robbery, that he contributed to his own 
conviction by not disclosing, even to his own lawyer, the likely whereabouts of the 
real murderer, and that he had not been completely truthful at his trial or on the
Reference.
I have no doubt some judges would not have made these comments. But if 
judges are expected to speak openly, directly and bluntly about matters that may 
be of public interest and importance, then we must be very careful indeed before 
we dilute that principle.
In my respectful view no principle of law or practice has ever been identified 
which precluded the Reference Court from saying what it thought should be said 
about Mr. Marshall’s conduct even though it decided it would not discuss the 
conduct of the other contributors to the miscarriage of justice from which he 
suffered. In my view, it committed no legal error.
VI. The Language of the Court’s Comments
There can hardly be any doubt that it was inaccurate and inappropriate to describe 
the miscarriage of justice suffered by Mr. Marshall as “... more apparent than 
real.” Absent capital punishment, it is difficult to imagine anything worse than to 
be wrongly convicted for murder and imprisoned for nearly 11 years on false, 
perjured and suppressed evidence.
Having said that, and without intending to minimize its inappropriateness, or 
to condone it in any way, it must be remembered that this “more apparent than 
real” is only one unfortunate error of language in a long and otherwise correct 
legal decision, and it is the only known mis-step of its kind in the long and 
otherwise distinguished careers of these judges. If there is any principle of 
proportionality, it should surely be applied in their favour. It does not, in my 
respectful view, call for the retrospective analysis undertaken by the majority. It 
was a bad mistake in choice of words, but that is all it was.
VII. Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, I would answer the Attorney’s question in the negative, 
that is to say that, based upon the conduct (of the judges) which has been 
examined by the Royal Commission, and commented upon in its Report, no 
recommendation for their removal from their offices should be made.
In response to the Attorney’s second letter, I would reply that there was no 
improper motivation behind the Court’s action.
